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Over the past few years, French sociologists Luc Boltanksi
and Laurent Thévenot have developed a so-called “prag-
matic sociology of critique.” In an effort to overcome the
perceived shortcomings of Bourdieusian “critical sociol-
ogy”—namely, the relative neglect of the perspectives of
social actors—Boltanksi and Thévenot’s work turns to the
ways in which individuals justify their actions and legitimize
their views to others in quite ordinary, everyday situations
(see Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999, 2006). In his most recent
book, On Critique: A Sociology of Emancipation, Boltanksi
goes a step further to argue the interdependence of both crit-
ical sociology and a pragmatic sociology of critique.
On Critique stems from three talks Boltanski gave as part
of the Adorno Lecture series at the Institute for Social Re-
search in Frankfurt, Germany in November 2008. Each talk
is divided in two, making up the six chapters of the book.
Boltanski focuses on the sociology of domination throughout
and in doing so, he attempts to make explicit the relationship
between sociology and critique.
In part one, Boltanski compares two sociological models
of critique: Bourdieusian critical sociology and the prag-
matic sociology of critique developed by Boltanski and his
colleagues. Although critical sociology is concerned with
the role of reflexivity in both the discipline of sociology and
everyday life, for Bourdieu, the relationship between criti-
cal reflexivity and practical reflexivity remains asymmetrical
(see Bourdieu, 2004). The pragmatic sociology of critique,
on the other hand, reexamines the distinction between criti-
cal sociologist and “ordinary” actor. This pragmatist model
roots the capacity for critique in the situations where “ordi-
nary” actors engage evaluation and criticism in their day to
day activities. Whereas critical sociology requires the critic
to assume a privileged position in order to debunk the facades
of social reality (as for example in the traditional critique of
ideology); pragmatic sociology of critique involves a plural-
ism of critique. The main contribution of pragmatic sociol-
ogy of critique, according to Boltanski (pg. 68), has been to
show how everyday moments of dispute have the potential
to shed light on the relationship between reality (that which
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hangs together) and the world (that which is uncertain). It is
in these situations that what people are in the process of do-
ing ceases to be self-evident. This underscores what Boltan-
ski believes to be at the core of most sociological questions:
“the uncertainty that threatens social arrangements and hence
the fragility of reality” (pg. 54). At the same time, Boltanski
cautions that the main shortcoming of both pragmatic and
critical approaches is the tendency to overstate tacit agree-
ment, or “common-sense,” which effectively glosses over the
importance of such uncertainty.
In the second portion of the book, Boltanski develops his
main thesis on the interdependence of critical sociology and
pragmatic sociology of critique. This requires him to reduce
the antagonisms between the two models of critique, which
he attempts by way of an elaborate, even sometimes diffi-
cult and convoluted, analysis of social institutions. Boltan-
ski starts from the position where radical uncertainty about
the social world prevails and explains that the very possibil-
ity of critique is entwined with the question of institutions.
He explains that the difficulty of conceiving and achieving
consensus, in contrast to sociologies that rely on notions
of “common-sense,” can be attributed to the fact that each
human-being is embodied in a body. This means that ev-
ery individual’s point of view occupies a different moment in
time and a different point in space. As such, no individual has
the requisite authority to provide a final answer to whatever is
at stake during moments of dispute. In situations where it is
necessary to put disagreements to an end, a third party must
be delegated a “monopoly of interpretation” (pg. 74). Since
this third party must not express their own point of view, the
task is assigned to a bodiless being: the institution (pg. 75).
Thus, although the bodiless being of institutions provide the
scaffolding from which domination operates, only embodied
persons can represent them. The intrinsic unease of the in-
stitutional order, which extends to the practices of everyday
actors, gives rise to what Boltanski calls “hermeneutic con-
tradiction.” That is to say, the threat to reality by the world
is both “external”—a reference which, based on the critique
of critical sociology, unmasks and challenges “the forms of
domination in a certain social order from a position of ex-
teriority” (pg. 50)—and “internal”—a position “carried out
from within, by actors involved in disputes, and inserted into
sequences of critique and justification, of highly variable lev-
els of generality” (pg. 50). This is the ground for Boltanski’s
37
38 ALEXANDER M. STONER
contention that critical sociology and a pragmatic sociology
of critique are both necessary and mutually dependent.
In the final portion of the book, Boltanski applies this ap-
proach to examine political regimes of domination and con-
cludes by discussing some theoretical and practical implica-
tions. Chapter five examines the actualization of hermeneutic
contradiction in two different regimes of domination: 1) sim-
ple domination and 2) complex, or managerial domination.
Boltanski pays more attention to the latter, as this regime of
domination is “better adjusted to contemporary democratic-
capitalist societies” (pg. 127). Much of the discussion draws
on Boltanski’s earlier work in The New Spirit of Capitalism
(Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005). Unlike regimes of simple
domination, whose aim is the preservation of order, the dom-
ination of complex managerial regimes is rooted in expertise
and based on systems that “intervene by promoting, manag-
ing and orienting change” (pg. 129). As such, managerial
regimes represent a new way of controlling critique; that is,
by incorporating it. The final chapter revisits the notion of
hermeneutic contradiction and its implications for pragmatic
sociology of critique and social emancipation. Boltanski
concludes on a cheerful note when he explains that a reflexive
treatment of the notion of hermeneutic contradiction, where
everyone understands and lives alongside this contradiction
would “open up to people the possibility of having some pur-
chase on the collectives of which they are component parts”
(pg. 155). Here Boltanski cites institutional crises, such as
the 2008 global financial crisis, as having the potential to
create an impetus through which such collectives can then
become mobilized.
On Critique represents serious challenges to both main-
stream sociologists, who tend to neglect the concrete daily
suffering of social life, and non-reflexive “progressive” soci-
ologists, who tend to “speak for” others by way of project-
ing their own ideologies onto so-called “oppressed” social
groups they then seek to “emancipate.” Although Boltanski’s
discussion of critique, domination, and emancipation is pow-
erful, even moving at times, his position on these matters no
doubt reflects his own social location as a prominent sociolo-
gist in French society, where the role of the public intellectual
still exists. The same cannot be said of American society.
Because Boltanski fails to make explicit how his efforts in
On Critique are mediated by the specificity of French culture
and history, he is unable to flesh out his relatively optimistic
concluding remarks regarding the potential he affords to the
widespread animus in the wake of the global financial cri-
sis. Why should mounting frustration correspond, or become
transposed into “progressive” collective action equally in dif-
ferent societies, if at all?
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